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1. When I say “probability” I do not mean a Kolmogorovian ‘probability measure’ or
similar mathematical notion. Of course, a definition—both coordinative1 and logical—
plays a constitutive role in the very concept to be defined. Nevertheless, there seems no
reason to include into the definition of probability that it “satisfies the Kolmogorovian
axioms of probability theory”. For, once we know—supposedly from the rest part
of the definition—what “probability” is in our world, it becomes a contingent fact of
the world whether it satisfies the Kolmogorovian axioms or not; which can be known
by a posteriori means. In other words, the aim of the so called “interpretations” of
probability is not to find an interpretation of the Kolmogorovian axioms, but to give a
sound meaning to scientific statements containing the term “probability”.
For example, consider the following assertions of quantum mechanics or statistical
mechanics:
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And compare them with other similar scientific assertions, like the Coulomb law,
E(r) = q
r− rq∣∣r− rq∣∣3 (3)
or just a simple statement about the length of a rod:
l = 4m (4)
In case (3) and (4) it is clear what the formulas assert. When we assert that the static
electric field strength of a point charge is equal to q r−rq|r−rq|3 , we have a previously defined
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physical quantity, electric field strength, and (3) expresses a contingent fact about this
quantity.
By “definition” I mean empirical/operational/verificationist definition. This is not
the place to argue for verificationism or operationalism. I only mention that my ap-
proach is based on a very weak operationalist/verificationist premise: scientific terms
assigned to quantities like the ones appearing in (1)–(4) must have empirical definitions
(except if the equations in question were definitions). In other words, those sentences
of a scientific theory which are supposed to describe objective facts of the world must
be expressible in observational/operational terms. Without this condition a scientific
theory could not be empirically confirmable or disconfirmable. I believe, this view
is widely accepted among physicists; although, the precise operational definition of a
physical quantity can be a non-trivial issue, even in the case of basic spatiotemporal
quantities.2 However, in itself, this premise is not yet equivalent to operationalism
or verificationism in general philosophical sense. It does not generally imply that a
statement is necessarily meaningless if it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable.
Now, contrary to (3) and (4), it is far from obvious what formulas (1) and (2) ac-
tually assert. What is the definition of the quantities on the left hand side of these
formulas? What is the probability of an event? This is the basic question of the philos-
ophy of probability. Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that the term “probability”
is used in the everyday scientific discourse, there is a consensus in the philosophical
literature34 that we have no satisfactory answer to this question.
2. The various approaches can be divided into two major groups. According to the
objectivist school, the probability of an event is something which characterizes a fea-
ture of the external world; roughly speaking, it is a property of the event and the cir-
cumstances. According to the subjectivist approach, on the contrary, the probability of
an event is something which characterizes a feature of the internal world; it is not a
property of the event and the circumstances, but a property of a particular intentional
state of mind about the event and the circumstances; a “degree” of belief. Objectivists’
probability is often called “chance” (ch); subjectivists’ probability is called “subjective
probability” or “credence” (cr). Thus, it must be emphasized that chance and credence
are not different interpretations of the same thing, but they are two different things,
belonging to different types of phenomena. If they exist in our world, they do so inde-
pendently; if they are at all connected, their connection must be a contingent fact of the
world. Nevertheless, we still don’t know exactly what chance is and what credence is.
3. No doubt, there is such a thing as a person’s credence or belief; and, no doubt,
it is meaningful to talk about the degree of a belief, as a belief can be stronger or
weaker; and perhaps one can characterize it with a number between 0 and 1, just like
a numeric scale from 0 to 10 can be asked to communicate the intensity of a patient’s
pain. And one can easily imagine some rules governing the complex mental processes
that determine this number; a dynamics by which this number changes in time under
various conditions.
All these things belong to the scope of ordinary empirical sciences like psychology,
cognitive science, human ethology, or sociology. Strangely enough, however, in the
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subjectivist literature, we cannot find any reference to the results of these empirical
sciences. It worth mentioning that the assertions in question are, at the same time,
quite ambitious. Consider only two examples.
Lewis’ Principal Principle asserts that a person’s credence is strictly determined by
some other mental states, namely:
cr (A|‘ch(A) = x’&K) = x (5)
where ‘ch(A) = x’ stands for the person’s knowledge that ch(A) = x and K stands
for some further “admissible” (mis)information. If this is true, it is quite a strict
causal/dynamical law of mental processes. Not to mention that those conditions that
make proposition ‘ch(A) = x’ knowledge (that is, true) and proposition K admissible,
are conditions in the external world. So, in its stronger understanding, the principle is
a statement about the relationship between the external world and one’s mental states.
My second example is the Bayesian law of confirmation. It describes how the
degree of a person’s belief in the truth of A changes due to getting information about a
new evidence E:
crt2(A) = crt1(A|E) = crt1(A)
crt1(E|A)
crt1(E)
(6)
where cht1 is the person’s previous credence function based on some earlier body of
believes, cht2 is the new credence function, based on the previous believes plus E.
This, too, is a very strong claim about the dynamics of mental processes.
4. How is it that the subjectivist interpretation of probability can claim so precise
quantitative laws about human mind without any reference to the results of empirical
sciences? There are two standard explanations of this ignorance, and both raise further
problems.
The first possibility is that the whole subjectivist theory is regarded as a kind of
“armchair metaphysics”. Typically, in Lewis’ “Subjectivist’s guide” the Principal Prin-
ciple is based on some “evidences” drawn from his own intuitive answers to his Ques-
tionnaire. He writes:
I have given undefended answers to my four questions. I hope you found
them obviously right, so that you will be willing to take them as evidence
for what follows. If not, do please reconsider. If so, splendid—now read
on.5
That is, we make a priori assertions about the real world, on the basis of our everyday
pre-scientific and pre-philosophical intuitions, without any reference to the epistemic
means by which the asserted facts of the world can be accessed.
However, if a statement is obviously true in our world, then the statement must
have an obvious meaning; there must be an obvious way in which the statement can
be verified, whether it is true indeed, or not. In other words, we need some empiri-
cal/coordinative definitions of the basic terms “credence” and “chance”.
The second possibility is that the subjectivist theory is regarded not as a theory
about real persons’ believes, but about the “credences of an abstract agent”. Terms
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like “chance”, “credence” or “agent” are only mathematical terms without any refer-
ence to the real world; the whole theory is a formal/mathematical construction, just
like Kolmogorov’s axiomatic theory of probability, group theory, or geometry. In this
mathematical construction, one can define a “gamble” in which the agent is making
“bets” on “outcome events”; one can define the notion of “rational agent “ as an agent
whose bets and credences are in a certain relation. One may make assumptions about
the “behavior of the gambling device”; for example one can assume that the “chances
of the outcome events” satisfy the axioms of Kolmogorov’s probability theory; and
from these premises, for example, one can prove the Dutch book theorem.
This is, of course, possible, but I believe this is not the final aim of subjectivist in-
terpretation of probability. At the end of the day we would like to apply these abstract
constructions in the metaphysical, epistemological, and scientific discourse about the
real world; therefore we need to know how to apply our theoretical terms like “cre-
dence” and “chance”. We would need to understand the meaning of these terms even if
the rules of subjectivist theory of probability should not be seen as a factual description
of actual human reasoning, but rather as a “normative standard of rationality”; since
we need to understand the rules in order to follow them.
Thus, in either case, what we are missing is the empirical/operational/verificationist
definitions of the basic concepts, first of all of “credence”; that is to say, a subjectivist’s
guide to objective chance would, first of all, require a guide to the subjectivist’s cre-
dence.
5. Therefore, it could only lead to circularities if the definition of chance ch(A) in-
cluded any essential reference to ‘ch(A) = x’ in the Principal Principle. The reason is
that the alleged relation (5) holds only if proposition K is “admissible”. “Admissibil-
ity” is, however, a concept the definition of which requires prior definitions of credence
and chance, independently:
A proposition P is admissible with respect to an outcome-specifying
proposition E for chance set-up S (E says that event e occurs) iff P con-
tains only the sort of information whose impact on reasonable credence
about E, if any, comes entirely by way of impact on credence about the
chances of those outcomes. [my italics]6
6. Let us return to the original problem of what “probability” means in the probabilis-
tic assertions of the sciences. First, it is worth pointing out some conceptual confusion
which needs to be sorted out. It is obvious that the concept of probability in science,
especially in physics, is objective probability. When the behavior of a physical system
is described by means of a probabilistic model, probabilities are supposed to describe
some objective features of the external world; no matter if the underlying physical pro-
cesses are deterministic or indeterministic. Classical statistical mechanics is a typical
example. We believe that the detailed process is governed by the deterministic laws of
classical mechanics; but, because of lacking the knowledge of the details, we give a less
detailed probabilistic model. The probabilities in such a model are sometimes called
“epistemic” probabilities. This is however a misleading terminology of the physicists,
which differs from the terminology of the philosophers. For, the reason why we give a
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probabilistic description of the system, instead of a completely detailed deterministic
one, is indeed related with a lack of knowledge, yet the probabilities in the model are
objective probabilities and have nothing to do with “knowledge”, “lack of informa-
tion”, etc. All statements of the probabilistic description of the system remain valid
even if we get complete information about the details; because none of the objective
features of the system described by the probabilities in question changes by knowing
more information about the system.
Let me give an everyday example. You are waiting for the next train in a subway
station. If you knew the exact timetable, you could make predictions like “The next
train will arrive in 3 minutes.” If you don’t know the timetable but only know that the
trains come in every 5 minutes, you can make less ambitious claims. For example, you
can say that “I will wait less than 5 minutes.”; or you can predict the following result of
a long-run experiment: ”Providing that the moments at which I enter to the station are
uniformly distributed in time, the long-run average of my waiting time is 2.5 minutes.”
Now, the validity of these claims does not change if you get know the timetable.
7. What we observe here is nothing but a kind of Humean supervenience. Objective
probabilities supervene on the collection of the particular facts of the actual history of
the world, that is, all occurrent facts in all regions of spacetime; on the Humean Mosaic.
And this is true, no matter if the world is deterministic or indeterministic; either in the
sense that the different time slices of the actual history are not functionally related;
either in the sense that there exist other possible histories of the world besides the
actual one; either in the sense of a more sophisticated branching structure of possible
spacetime-histories.
On the one hand this is trivially true; on the other hand, one has to put it in a
more precise form: The truth or falsity of all meaningful statements about objective
probabilities supervene on the Humean Mosaic, where “meaningful” is meant in a
verificationist sense; that is, a statement is meaningful if it is expressible in terms of
the Humean Mosaic.
Note, however, that this is also true for subjective probabilities: The truth or falsity
of all meaningful statements about subjective probabilities supervene on the Humean
Mosaic. The question is, of course: what are the meaningful statements about sub-
jective probabilities? Another note: although the truth or falsity of all meaningful
statements about both objective and subjective probabilities are determined by the ac-
tual content of Humean Mosaic, their truth or falsity can be known only by a posteriori
means.
8. Nevertheless, what is chance and what is credence? We still do not have a ten-
able definition of probability, neither objective nor subjective. And how is it possible
that physics and other empirical sciences do not notice problems arising from these
unanswered fundamental questions? As to the concept of objective probability, in one
of my earlier papers7 I proposed a possible resolution which I call “No-probability
Interpretation of Probability”.
The key idea of my proposal is this: there is no such property of an event as its
“probability”. That is why the standard interpretations fail to give a sound definition of
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probability; and that is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a
definition. Whenever we use the term “probability” in scientific discourse, its meaning
varies from context to context: it means different dimensionless [0,1]-valued phys-
ical quantities, or more precisely, different dimensionless normalized measures com-
posed by different physical quantities in the various specific situations. Moreover, these
context-dependent meanings reduce the concept of “probability” to ordinary physical
quantities of empirical meanings, like relative frequency on a finite sample, ratio of
phase-space volumes, or the quantities on the right hand side of formulas (1)–(2).
Consider my example in Point 6. One can calculate the average waiting time only
from the fact that the trains come in every 5 minutes and that the moments of time
when I enter to the station are uniformly distributed. These facts are ordinary, empiri-
cally verifiable, physical facts. The calculation requires only kinematics, without even
mentioning “probabilities”. If, however, someone would like to enforce a probabilistic
language, the calculation of the average waiting time could be presented in the follow-
ing way: I don’t know when I entered to the station relative to the arrival of the train.
Since all moments of time of my entering are of equal probability, I calculate with a
uniform probability distribution. . . And the result will be the same. But, there appeared
a term—probability—which has no definition. The statements containing this term,
like “all moments of time of my entering to the station are of equal probability”, are
meaningless; it is impossible to verify whether they are true or not. As the example
shows, however, the concept of “probability” is completely needless.
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